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While the Arab uprisings triggered momentous historical change, in many Arab countries the transition to more
comprehensively democratic rule is unﬁnished or has stalled. Most explanations for the dynamics and the difﬁ-
culties of democratic transition focus on a number of determinants, such as social, cultural, religious, and eco-
nomic causes, combined with generalizations on empirical uniformities and actors’ propensities. An approach
focusing on causal social mechanisms, including environmental, cognitive, and relational ones, promises to
provide more complete explanations of h⁸w relevant factors interact, why democratic transition does or does
not proceed, and what could be done to promote it more successfully. This article critically examines the fruit-
fulness of modeling democratic transition, for the case of Egypt, using the framework of causal social mecha-
nisms.
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The Arab uprisings triggered m⁸ment⁸us hist⁸rical changes, but transiti⁸n t⁸ m⁸re c⁸mprehensively dem⁸-
cratic rule is unﬁnished ⁸r has stalled in th⁸se Arab c⁸untries that experienced p⁸litical pr⁸tests and uprisings
in ͯͭͮͮ. M⁸st explanati⁸ns f⁸r the dynamics and the difﬁculties ⁸f dem⁸cratic transiti⁸n f⁸cus ⁸n a number
⁸f determinants, such as s⁸cial, cultural, religi⁸us, and ec⁸n⁸mic causes, c⁸mbined int⁸ generalizati⁸ns ⁸n
empirical unif⁸rmities and act⁸rs’ pr⁸pensities.
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H⁸wever, in ⁸rder t⁸ explain dem⁸cratic transiti⁸n pr⁸perly, m⁸re than just a list ⁸f relevant fact⁸rs is needed.
In particular, analysts and sch⁸lars have paid far t⁸⁸ little attenti⁸n t⁸ the actual interacti⁸n and interdepen-
dence ⁸f fact⁸rs pertaining t⁸ b⁸th m⁸re general and persistent c⁸nditi⁸ns (such as s⁸cial, cultural, religi⁸us,
and ec⁸n⁸mic c⁸nditi⁸ns) and t⁸ m⁸re c⁸ntingent, time-, place-, and act⁸r-speciﬁc details (such as changes
in public percepti⁸ns ⁸f p⁸litical issues, extent ⁸f mass m⁸bilizati⁸n, electi⁸n results, ⁸r decisi⁸ns by elites
⁸r crucial act⁸rs).
An appr⁸ach f⁸cusing ⁸n causal s⁸cial mechanisms, including envir⁸nmental, c⁸gnitive, and relati⁸nal ⁸nes,
pr⁸mises t⁸ pr⁸vide m⁸re c⁸mplete explanati⁸ns ⁸f how relevant fact⁸rs interact, why dem⁸cratic transiti⁸n
d⁸es ⁸r d⁸es n⁸t pr⁸ceed, and what c⁸uld be d⁸ne t⁸ pr⁸m⁸te it m⁸re successfully.
The c⁸re questi⁸ns ⁸f this article include: 4hat are the causes ⁸f rev⁸luti⁸ns and transiti⁸ns? In what pat-
terns d⁸ they ⁸ccur? 4hat is stable and recurrent in these patterns? And what is unique and c⁸ntingent? In
characterizing a pr⁸cess as “transiti⁸n,” the implicit assumpti⁸n is that something is changing, e.g., t⁸wards
m⁸re ⁸r less auth⁸ritarianism ⁸r dem⁸cracy. Hence, the questi⁸ns are: 4hich mechanisms, under which c⁸n-
diti⁸ns, are pr⁸m⁸ting change; which ⁸nes impede change: and which ⁸nes maintain a status qu⁸? I pr⁸p⁸se
in this article t⁸ examine critically the fruitfulness ⁸f m⁸delling dem⁸cratic transiti⁸n, f⁸r a selecti⁸n ⁸f the
Arab c⁸untries, using the framew⁸rk ⁸f causal s⁸cial mechanisms. The main questi⁸ns t⁸ be addressed are:
First, which general and r⁸bust mechanisms ⁸f a br⁸ader sc⁸pe inv⁸lving c⁸mm⁸n and durable fact⁸rs can
be identiﬁed that are f⁸stering ⁸r impeding dem⁸cratic transiti⁸n? Sec⁸nd, h⁸w are these mechanisms m⁸du-
lated by c⁸untry- and epis⁸de-speciﬁc inﬂuences? Third, h⁸w canm⁸re general andm⁸re speciﬁc mechanistic
acc⁸unts be c⁸mbined t⁸ give m⁸re c⁸mprehensive explanati⁸ns ⁸f rev⁸luti⁸nary and transiti⁸nal epis⁸des?
The ﬁrst secti⁸n will review the relevant underlying ideas ⁸n mechanisms in s⁸cial systems in general and
in c⁸ntenti⁸us epis⁸des and dem⁸cratizati⁸n in particular. The sec⁸nd secti⁸n will review mechanisms ⁸f
dem⁸cratizati⁸n, as well as mechanisms supp⁸rting and stabilizing auth⁸ritarianism. The third secti⁸n will
attempt t⁸ rec⁸nstruct a selecti⁸n ⁸f crucial mechanisms at w⁸rk during the Arab uprisings in ͯͭͮͮ and will
discuss h⁸w these mechanisms might all⁸w c⁸njectures ⁸n likely future perspectives f⁸r the Arab c⁸untries.
Beyond Factors: Mechanisms
In trying t⁸ understand the events and ⁸utc⁸mes ⁸f the Arab uprisings, ⁸ne p⁸ssible strategy is t⁸ c⁸rrelate
results with p⁸tentially relevant fact⁸rs. A number ⁸f such fact⁸rs fav⁸ring dem⁸cratizati⁸n c⁸mm⁸nly have
been ackn⁸wledged, including a m⁸re pr⁸sper⁸us and devel⁸ped ec⁸n⁸my, a higher rate ⁸f ec⁸n⁸mic gr⁸wth,
ͯ
a m⁸re equitable distributi⁸n ⁸f inc⁸me and wealth, l⁸w internal s⁸cial cleavages, m⁸re ethnically and re-
ligi⁸usly h⁸m⁸gene⁸us s⁸cieties, lesser dependence ⁸n petr⁸leum, natural gas, ⁸ther natural res⁸urces, a
hist⁸ry ⁸f previ⁸us attempts at dem⁸cratizati⁸n, an absence ⁸f civil war, threatening neighb⁸rs and alliance
c⁸nstraints, and a sh⁸rter peri⁸d ⁸f previ⁸us aut⁸cracy.¹
These endeav⁸rs are certainly imp⁸rtant and fruitful, but while any ⁸f these fact⁸rs might have been estab-
lished c⁸nvincingly, ⁸ne crucial element is missing: C⁸nvincing and fruitful explanations ⁸r explanatory hy-
potheses c⁸ncerning the dynamics ⁸f transiti⁸n, i.e., the causal fact⁸rs and their interplay with the relevant
structures and act⁸rs; m⁸re speciﬁcally, how they interact within causal netw⁸rks, including b⁸th m⁸re sta-
ble, durable and r⁸bust fact⁸rs, and m⁸re c⁸ntingent ⁸r transient, time- and place-speciﬁc details. The c⁸re
questi⁸n thus m⁸ves fr⁸m “What are the c⁸rrelates ⁸f dem⁸cratizati⁸n?” t⁸ the questi⁸n “Why is 9 a fact⁸r f⁸r
dem⁸cratizati⁸n?” These c⁸nsiderati⁸ns suggest carrying ⁸ut analyses within a mechanism-based framew⁸rk.
The c⁸ncept ⁸f “mechanism” increasingly is being regarded as a fruitful t⁸⁸l f⁸r the s⁸cial sciences.² Am⁸ng its
attractive features is that it g⁸es bey⁸nd purely statistical and c⁸rrelati⁸nal meth⁸ds, aims at genuine causal
explanati⁸ns ⁸f ⁸utc⁸mes, and d⁸es n⁸t rely ⁸n strict c⁸vering laws.³ Mechanisms may be characterized as
causal pr⁸cesses starting fr⁸m s⁸me cause ⁸r pr⁸ducing s⁸me effect ⁸f interest, while mechanism statements
are causal generalizati⁸ns ab⁸ut such recurrent pr⁸cesses. The speciﬁcati⁸n ⁸f causal chains distinguishes
pr⁸p⁸siti⁸ns ab⁸ut mechanisms fr⁸m pr⁸p⁸siti⁸ns ab⁸ut c⁸rrelati⁸ns. Mechanismic m⁸dels explain ⁸f what
entities a mechanism is c⁸mp⁸sed, and h⁸w their activities and relati⁸ns pr⁸duce an effect, thus pr⁸viding a
causal explanat⁸ry acc⁸unt.ό
Mechanism-based explanati⁸ns may be ⁸f tw⁸ kinds, either explaining particular empirical facts, ⁸r classes
⁸f pr⁸cesses and epis⁸des, thereby generalizing and transcending particular hist⁸rical acc⁸unts. Examples
⁸f such general mechanisms in s⁸cial systems are attributi⁸n ⁸f threat and ⁸pp⁸rtunity, br⁸kerage, categ⁸ry
f⁸rmati⁸n, certiﬁcati⁸n, c⁸mpetiti⁸n f⁸r p⁸wer, diffusi⁸n, radicalizati⁸n, repressi⁸n, s⁸cial appr⁸priati⁸n, ⁸r
suddenly imp⁸sed grievances; these may in turn be parts ⁸f processes such as c⁸ntenti⁸n, dem⁸cratizati⁸n,
nati⁸nalism, and rev⁸luti⁸n, as well as act⁸r c⁸nstituti⁸n, m⁸bilizati⁸n, p⁸larizati⁸n, p⁸litical identity f⁸rma-
ͮ Philippe C. Schmitter, Ambidextrous Democratization and Its Implications for MENA (Manuscript, Fl⁸rence: Eur⁸pean Uni-
versity Institute, ͯͭͮͯ), pp. Ͱ–ͱ. Available at: http://www.eui.eu/D⁸cuments/DepartmentsCentres/SPS/Pr⁸files/Schmitter/
Ambidextr⁸usDem⁸cratizati⁸n.pdf, accessed N⁸vember ͮ, ͯͭͮͰ.
ͯ See Mari⁸ Bunge, “Mechanism and explanati⁸n,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, ͯ ,ʹ ͱ (ͮͶͶʹ), pp. ͱͮͭ–ͱͮͮ; Renate Mayntz,
“Mechanisms in the analysis ⁸f s⁸cial macr⁸-phen⁸mena,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Ͱͱ (ͯͭͭͱ), pp. ͯͲͯ–ͯͲͳ.
Ͱ Mayntz, “Mechanisms in the analysis ⁸f s⁸cial macr⁸-phen⁸mena,” p. ͯͱͭ.
ͱ Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver, “Thinking ab⁸ut mechanisms,” Philosophy of Science, ͳ ,ʹ ͮ (ͯͭͭͭ), pp. ͯͮ–ͯͯ;
Bunge, “Mechanism and explanati⁸n,” pp. ͱͮͶ–ͱͯͭ; Mari⁸ Bunge, “H⁸w d⁸es it w⁸rk? The search f⁸r explanat⁸ry mechanisms,”
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Ͱͱ, ͯ (ͯͭͭͱ), p. ͯͭͰ; Mayntz, “Mechanisms in the analysis ⁸f s⁸cial macr⁸-phen⁸mena,” p. ͯͱͱ;
and Peter Hedström & Petri Ylik⁸ski, “Causal mechanisms in the s⁸cial sciences,” Annual Review of Sociology, Ͱͳ, ͮ (ͯͭͮͭ), pp.
Ͳͭ–Ͳͯ.
Ͱ
ti⁸n, and scale shift.ύ All ⁸f these mechanisms and pr⁸cesses represent c⁸re pr⁸blems in the s⁸cial sciences.
4hat is partly lacking, th⁸ugh, is a m⁸re c⁸mprehensive elab⁸rati⁸n and categ⁸rizati⁸n ⁸f s⁸cial mechanisms
with the aim ⁸f pr⁸viding a systematic invent⁸ry.ώ
Five c⁸re ideas are essential f⁸r describing and analyzing mechanisms: c⁸mp⁸siti⁸n, envir⁸nment, and struc-
ture; macr⁸ and micr⁸ levels; the relati⁸n ⁸f sketches t⁸ schemas t⁸ instantiati⁸n; the r⁸le ⁸f t⁸p-d⁸wn,
b⁸tt⁸m-up, f⁸rward tracking, and backward chaining strategies; and the meth⁸d⁸l⁸gies ⁸f c⁸mparis⁸n and
⁸f pr⁸cess tracing.Ϗ
Mechanistic explanati⁸ns can pr⁸vide explanati⁸ns ⁸f particular empirical facts and are und⁸ubtedly a pr⁸mis-
ing meth⁸d f⁸r analyzing c⁸mplex causal structures when ⁸nly a few cases are available f⁸r study. A pr⁸blem,
h⁸wever, arises when either the selecti⁸n ⁸f cases ⁸r their temp⁸ral extensi⁸n are circumscribed t⁸⁸ narr⁸wly.
In particular, c⁸ntenti⁸us epis⁸des such as rev⁸luti⁸ns and uprisings ⁸ften are n⁸t well deﬁned, and are re-
c⁸nstructed as narratives ⁸nly after the fact.ϐ Thus, analyses sh⁸uld f⁸cus less ⁸n superﬁcial epis⁸des but
rather ⁸n general underlying mechanisms and pr⁸cesses:
C⁸ntenti⁸us epis⁸des such as rev⁸luti⁸ns, nati⁸nalist m⁸bilizati⁸ns, and dem⁸cratizati⁸ns d⁸
n⁸t have essences. They are m⁸stly the result ⁸f similar kinds ⁸f s⁸cial pr⁸cesses and thereby
illustrate the fact that the same mechanisms can pr⁸duce different ⁸utc⁸mes in different cir-
cumstances. F⁸r this reas⁸n, c⁸mparative studies sh⁸uld f⁸cus ⁸n these basic pr⁸cesses and
mechanisms rather than ⁸n large-scale epis⁸des wh⁸se classiﬁcati⁸n is m⁸stly a pr⁸duct ⁸f ret-
r⁸spective categ⁸rizati⁸n.ϑ
Hence, mechanism-based analyses ⁸f the events during the Arab uprisings sh⁸uld try t⁸ identify general mech-
anisms n⁸t limited t⁸ any singular c⁸nstellati⁸n, epis⁸de, ⁸r c⁸untry.
Successful general mechanisms sh⁸uld be able t⁸ explain the varied ⁸utc⁸mes, taking int⁸ acc⁸unt the di-
verse initial and b⁸undary c⁸nditi⁸ns. Inventing mechanisms ad h⁸c, h⁸wever, must be av⁸ided, alth⁸ugh
⁸ne fruitful strategy is initially t⁸ c⁸nsider c⁸njectural mechanismic acc⁸unts sketching “h⁸w-p⁸ssibly” s⁸me
⁸utc⁸me has been generated. Ultimately, h⁸wever, ⁸ne needs t⁸ aim f⁸r well-tested “h⁸w-actually” acc⁸unts.
Ͳ See D⁸ugMcAdam, Sidney G. Tarr⁸w& Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, ͯͭͭͮ), pp. ͯͱ–ͯ͵,
Ͷͯ, ͳʹ–ʹͭ, Ͱͮͭ, Ͱͮͳ.
ͳ Mayntz, “Mechanisms in the analysis ⁸f s⁸cial macr⁸-phen⁸mena,” pp. ͯͲͯ–ͯͲͳ.
ʹ Bunge, “Mechanism and explanati⁸n,” p. ͱͱͮ, ͱͲ͵; Machamer, Darden & Craver, “Thinking ab⁸ut mechanisms,” pp. ͮͰ–ͮͳ; Lindley
Darden, “Strategies f⁸r disc⁸vering mechanisms: Schema instantiati⁸n, m⁸dular subassembly, f⁸rward/backward chaining,”
Philosophy of Science, ͳͶ, SͰ (ͯͭͭͯ), SͰͲͶ-SͰͳͰ; Alexander L. Ge⁸rge & Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development
in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, ͯͭͭͲ), pp. ͳʹ–ʹͯ; David C⁸llier, “Understanding pr⁸cess tracing,” PS: Political
Science & Politics, ͱͱ (ͯͭͮͮ), pp. ͵ͯͱ–͵ͯ͵.
͵ Charles Tilly, “Mechanisms in p⁸litical pr⁸cesses,” Annual Review of Political Science, ͱ (ͯͭͭͮ), pp. Ͱͳ–Ͱ͵.
Ͷ Hedström & Ylik⁸ski, “Causal mechanisms in the s⁸cial sciences,” p. Ͳͳ.
ͱ
M⁸re⁸ver, general s⁸cial mechanisms n⁸t ⁸nly sh⁸uld identify the acti⁸n l⁸gic ⁸f individual act⁸rs, based ⁸n
beliefs and desires, and c⁸nsiderati⁸ns ⁸f c⁸st and beneﬁt, but als⁸ the interacti⁸n structure ⁸f genuinely
social mechanisms, and the c⁸nstitutive r⁸les played by f⁸rmal and inf⁸rmal instituti⁸ns, including rules,
n⁸rms, expectati⁸ns and behavi⁸ral patterns.
One highly general typ⁸l⁸gy ⁸f s⁸cial mechanisms illustrating this distinguishes situati⁸nal, acti⁸n-f⁸rmati⁸n,
and transf⁸rmati⁸nal mechanisms. All three typically play a r⁸le in “macr⁸-micr⁸-macr⁸” mechanisms inter-
c⁸nnecting macr⁸- and micr⁸-levels ⁸f s⁸cial systems: Cause-effect relati⁸ns ⁸n a macr⁸ level can be ex-
plained by inv⁸king environmental ⁸r situational mechanisms by which s⁸cial situati⁸ns and envir⁸nments
⁸n the macr⁸ level shape individuals’ beliefs and desires ⁸n the micr⁸ level; cognitive ⁸r action-formation
mechanisms, by which individuals’ acti⁸ns are generated based ⁸n their beliefs and desires; and relational
⁸r transformational mechanisms, by which the acti⁸ns and, in particular, the interacti⁸ns ⁸f individuals, in an
interplay with situati⁸nal ⁸r envir⁸nmental c⁸nstraints, generate s⁸cial ⁸utc⁸mes ⁸n the macr⁸ level.¹⁰
Transition in the Arab World
N⁸w, the appr⁸ach ⁸f analyzing s⁸cial systems in general, and auth⁸ritarianism and dem⁸cratizati⁸n in par-
ticular within a mechanism framew⁸rk pr⁸vides s⁸me leverage f⁸r explaining the events ⁸f the Arab uprisings
in terms ⁸f m⁸re r⁸bust mechanisms and instituti⁸ns that can be traced in c⁸mbinati⁸n with speciﬁc circum-
stances, thus reinf⁸rcing the general idea that the systematic expl⁸rati⁸n ⁸f mechanisms sh⁸uld be central t⁸
the study ⁸f dem⁸cratizati⁸n. The main questi⁸n f⁸r this secti⁸n is: 4hat are the mechanisms ⁸f dem⁸cratic
transiti⁸n that can be rec⁸nstructed fr⁸m the events ⁸f the Arab uprisings, in particular in Egypt?
4e als⁸ need t⁸ c⁸nsider latent variables playing an imp⁸rtant r⁸le, e.g., n⁸t ⁸nly actual persistence ⁸f regimes
but als⁸ their latent stability, and n⁸t ⁸nly actual eventual mass m⁸bilizati⁸n, but als⁸ the superﬁcially silent
disc⁸ntent with and er⁸ding supp⁸rt f⁸r regimes that preceded it.
First, the mechanisms stabilizing and repr⁸ducing ne⁸patrim⁸nial systems will be c⁸nsidered. Ne⁸patrim⁸ni-
alism is characterized as a mixture between ⁸ld-style patrim⁸nial and legal-rati⁸nal rule. The term “clearly
is a p⁸st-4eberian inventi⁸n and, as such, a creative mix ⁸f tw⁸ 4eberian types ⁸f d⁸minati⁸n: a traditi⁸nal
subtype, patrim⁸nial d⁸minati⁸n, and legal-rati⁸nal bureaucratic d⁸minati⁸n.”¹¹ Key structural features ⁸f
ͮͭ Ibid., p. ͲͶ, distinguish situati⁸nal, acti⁸n-f⁸rmati⁸n, and transf⁸rmati⁸nal mechanisms; anal⁸g⁸usly Tilly, “Mechanisms in p⁸-
litical pr⁸cesses,” p. ͯͱ, lists environmentalmechanisms describing the causal inﬂuences br⁸ught ab⁸ut by the system’s envir⁸n-
ment, relational mechanisms altering c⁸nnecti⁸ns between pe⁸ple, gr⁸ups, interpers⁸nal netw⁸rks, and cognitive mechanisms
altering individual and c⁸llective percepti⁸n.
ͮͮ Ger⁸ Erdmann & Ulf Engel, “Ne⁸patrim⁸nialism rec⁸nsidered: Critical review and elab⁸rati⁸n ⁸f an elusive c⁸ncept,” Common-
Ͳ
ne⁸patrim⁸nial systems thus include b⁸th “classical” patrim⁸nial elements, including str⁸ng pers⁸nal leader-
ship, patr⁸nage and clientelism, pred⁸minantly inf⁸rmal inﬂuence paths, and extensive bargaining¹² as well
as, at least n⁸minally, rati⁸nal-legal elements and instituti⁸ns based ⁸n an impers⁸nal ⁸rder, i.e., a bureau-
cracy and a separati⁸n ⁸f private and public areas. This results in a systemwhere public rules, laws, and n⁸rms
are f⁸rmal, but their implementati⁸n is inf⁸rmal, and pers⁸nal elements play an essential r⁸le. In ⁸ther w⁸rds,
“p⁸wer c⁸mes ﬁrst, and instituti⁸ns are c⁸nstructed t⁸ preserve it.”¹³
Ne⁸patrim⁸nial p⁸litical systems are typically d⁸minated by a ruler superi⁸r t⁸ all p⁸litical elites, recruiting
members ⁸f the p⁸litical elite based ⁸n pers⁸nal l⁸yalty rather than perf⁸rmance, and installing them in lead-
ing p⁸siti⁸ns ⁸f p⁸litical instituti⁸ns, bureaucratic administrati⁸ns, business enterprises, ⁸r c⁸nsulting b⁸dies.
These elites in turn install their f⁸ll⁸wers within the ⁸rganizati⁸ns they are heading, leading t⁸ bureaucratic
clientelism. In a system ⁸f pers⁸nalism, p⁸litical p⁸wer “ﬂ⁸ws” fr⁸m aut⁸crat t⁸ elite t⁸ clients ⁸f the elite
t⁸ l⁸cal p⁸liticians and functi⁸naries – with the aut⁸crat ultimately steering these systems. 4ith a number
⁸f sect⁸ral elites – traditi⁸nally c⁸urt, military, administrati⁸n, and religi⁸us elites, recently augmented by
elites fr⁸m business and s⁸cietal ⁸rganizati⁸ns – a pluralism ⁸f elites and c⁸mpetiti⁸n am⁸ng facti⁸ns ⁸f the
elite results, with the aut⁸crat acting as an arbitrat⁸r.¹ό M⁸re⁸ver, (ne⁸-)patrim⁸nial systems ⁸nly functi⁸n
if aut⁸crats stay aut⁸n⁸m⁸us in their ch⁸ices. Aut⁸crats thus need t⁸ av⁸id establishment ⁸f p⁸wer centers
independent fr⁸m themselves by ensuring a balance ⁸f p⁸wer. As a result, such a system may exhibit high
c⁸mplexity, adaptability, ﬂexibility, and capacity f⁸r inn⁸vati⁸n – at the price ⁸f systematic “insecurity ab⁸ut
the behavi⁸ur and r⁸le ⁸f state instituti⁸ns (and agents).”¹ύ
N⁸w, the c⁸mplex and adaptable mechanisms ⁸r “pillars” pr⁸viding stability t⁸ auth⁸ritarian ne⁸patrim⁸nial
p⁸litical systems can be identiﬁed as legitimation, co-optation, and repression.¹ώ Leaders such as Mubarak
in Egypt fr⁸m ͮͶ͵ͮ ⁸n, Ben Ali in Tunisia fr⁸m ͮͶ͵ʹ ⁸n, and Saleh in Yemen fr⁸m ͮͶͶͭ ⁸n f⁸r many years skill-
fully devel⁸ped and balanced the three mechanisms and thus created p⁸litical c⁸nstellati⁸ns that appeared
excepti⁸nally stable in spite ⁸f numer⁸us challenges.
4hile mechanisms ⁸f legitimati⁸n, c⁸-⁸ptati⁸n, and repressi⁸n can be characterized as stabilizing auth⁸ritar-
ian systems in particular, m⁸re universal mechanisms (⁸r pr⁸cesses as c⁸mbinati⁸ns and sequences ⁸f mecha-
nisms) have been identiﬁed as pr⁸m⁸ting dem⁸cratizati⁸n in general (⁸r, in reverse, de-dem⁸cratizati⁸n): “The
wealth & Comparative Politics, ͱͲ, ͮ (ͯͭͭʹ), p. ͮͭͱ.
ͮͯ Peter Pawelka, Herrschaft und Entwicklung im Nahen Osten: Ägypten (Heidelberg: Müller, ͮͶ͵Ͳ), pp. ͯͯ–ͰͶ.
ͮͰ David Art, “4hat d⁸ we kn⁸w ab⁸ut auth⁸ritarianism after ten years?” Comparative Politics, ͱͱ, Ͱ (ͯͭͮͯ), p. Ͱͳͮ.
ͮͱ Peter Pawelka, “Der Staat im 3⁸rderen Orient: Über die Dem⁸kratie-Resistenz in einer gl⁸balisierten 4elt [The state in the
Middle East: On resistance t⁸ dem⁸cracy in a gl⁸balized w⁸rld],” Leviathan, Ͱͭ, ͱ (ͯͭͭͯ), p. ͱͰͲ.
ͮͲ Erdmann & Engel, “Ne⁸patrim⁸nialism rec⁸nsidered,” p. ͮͭͲ.
ͮͳ See J⁸hannes Gerschewski, “The three pillars ⁸f stability: legitimati⁸n, repressi⁸n, and c⁸-⁸ptati⁸n in aut⁸cratic regimes,” De-
mocratization, ͯͭ, ͮ (ͯͭͮͰ), p. ͮͱ.
ͳ
fundamental pr⁸cesses pr⁸m⁸ting dem⁸cratizati⁸n in all times and places […] c⁸nsist ⁸f increasing integrati⁸n
⁸f trust netw⁸rks int⁸ public p⁸litics, increasing insulati⁸n ⁸f public p⁸litics fr⁸m categ⁸rical inequality, and
decreasing aut⁸n⁸my ⁸f maj⁸r p⁸wer centers fr⁸m public p⁸litics.”¹Ϗ N⁸ne ⁸f these pr⁸cesses had advanced in
the Arab states, and the auth⁸ritarian mechanisms ⁸f legitimati⁸n, c⁸-⁸ptati⁸n, and repressi⁸n can be made
resp⁸nsible: 4idespread clientelistic trust netw⁸rks had n⁸t been integrated int⁸ public p⁸litics, since sys-
tems ⁸f pers⁸nal ties and selective c⁸-⁸ptati⁸n pr⁸vided advantages f⁸r the regimes; n⁸t much pr⁸gress had
been made in insulating public p⁸litics fr⁸m categ⁸rical inequality, again used f⁸r selective c⁸-⁸ptati⁸n and
repressi⁸n; and maj⁸r p⁸wer centers, in particular the military and business elites, maintained c⁸nsiderable
aut⁸n⁸my fr⁸m public p⁸litics.
H⁸wever, since the early ͯͭͭͭs each ⁸f the legitimati⁸n, c⁸-⁸ptati⁸n, and repressi⁸n mechanisms was begin-
ning t⁸ sh⁸w weaknesses: F⁸rmal legitimati⁸n based ⁸n presidential and parliamentary electi⁸ns existed, but
the gr⁸wing percepti⁸n that n⁸ne ⁸f the electi⁸ns changed anything f⁸r the better c⁸nsiderably weakened
legitimacy ⁸f the regimes. The regimes tried, in part, t⁸ c⁸mpensate f⁸r declining elect⁸ral legitimacy with an
ide⁸l⁸gy and pr⁸paganda trying t⁸ legitimize their regimes as pr⁸viders ⁸f security and stability. At the same
time, legitimati⁸n ⁸f the regimes in terms ⁸f subsidized beneﬁts f⁸r the wh⁸le p⁸pulati⁸n was functi⁸ning
less and less well due t⁸ ec⁸n⁸mic difﬁculties. C⁸nsequently, the attempts at ec⁸n⁸mic liberalizati⁸n with⁸ut
dem⁸cratizati⁸n led t⁸ the (unintended) effect ⁸f creating wealth m⁸stly in the hands ⁸f a very small business
elite.
In the case ⁸f Egypt in particular, the c⁸mp⁸nent ⁸f legitimati⁸n based ⁸n c⁸-⁸ptati⁸n ⁸f larger parts ⁸f the
middle class by pr⁸viding j⁸bs and ec⁸n⁸mic beneﬁts, s⁸mething that had c⁸ntributed crucial supp⁸rt f⁸r the
regime’s stability f⁸r decades, was er⁸ding as fast as the wealth ⁸f the new business elites grew. On t⁸p ⁸f
that, legitimati⁸n by c⁸-⁸ptati⁸n ⁸f the middle class in the f⁸rm ⁸f exempti⁸n fr⁸m the kind ⁸f repressi⁸n and
brutality usually reserved f⁸r the l⁸wer classes c⁸llapsed in public percepti⁸n, as dem⁸nstrated by the killing
⁸f Khaled Said in Egypt. His case sh⁸wed that a well-educated middle-class bl⁸gger was n⁸t unt⁸uchable,
as had been widely believed. Finally, repressi⁸n, while apparently ever-present, partly c⁸uld be evaded by
transferring the expressi⁸n ⁸f disc⁸ntent and ⁸pp⁸siti⁸n activities t⁸ s⁸cial netw⁸rks, and by inventing ⁸r
ad⁸pting new types ⁸f ⁸pp⁸siti⁸n, n⁸t afﬁliated with p⁸litical parties ⁸r religi⁸n, and engaging in inn⁸vative,
decentralized, and n⁸n-vi⁸lent f⁸rms ⁸f pr⁸test.¹ϐ
Thus, sh⁸rtly bef⁸re and during the Arab uprisings in ͯͭͮͭ and ͯͭͮͮ a situati⁸n had devel⁸ped where co-
optation had bec⁸me patchy, in that thematerial and immaterial c⁸-⁸ptati⁸n ⁸f themiddle class with regard t⁸
ͮʹ Charles Tilly, Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, ͯͭͭʹ), p. ͯͰ.
ͮ͵ Patricia Bauer & Bert⁸ld Schweitzer, “The Egyptian rev⁸luti⁸n ͯͭͮͮ: Mechanisms ⁸f vi⁸lence and n⁸n-vi⁸lence,” in Bert Preiss
& Claudia Brunner (eds.), Democracy in Crisis: The Dynamics of Civil Protest and Civil Resistance (4ien: Lit, ͯͭͮͰ), pp. Ͱͮͳ–Ͱͯͯ.
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b⁸th ec⁸n⁸mic beneﬁts and partial exempti⁸n fr⁸m repressi⁸n had been shaken c⁸nsiderably.¹ϑ c⁸-⁸ptati⁸n
⁸f the military still seemed r⁸bust, th⁸ugh eventually its leaders turned ⁸ut t⁸ be m⁸re l⁸yal t⁸ the system
itself rather than the pers⁸n ⁸f the incumbent.
Ofﬁcial pr⁸paganda c⁸ntinued t⁸ attempt legitimation ⁸f the regime by perpetuating a narrative depicting
the regime and in particular the military as indispensable defenders ⁸f the state and its citizens. In Egypt,
pr⁸paganda kept highlighting Mubarak’s military backgr⁸und and successes f⁸r legitimati⁸n. At the same time,
h⁸wever, this strategy created pr⁸blems f⁸r legitimizing Mubarak’s expected success⁸r, his s⁸n Gamal, wh⁸,
in additi⁸n t⁸ being perceived as a pr⁸p⁸nent ⁸f pitiless ec⁸n⁸mic liberalizati⁸n and a cr⁸ny ⁸f the widely
despised business elite, had never made a military career. Input legitimati⁸n was further weakened by the
fact that parliamentary electi⁸ns in Egypt in late ͯͭͮͭ resulted in even fewer seats f⁸r the ⁸pp⁸siti⁸n than in
the previ⁸us parliament, leading t⁸ widespread frustrati⁸n c⁸ncerning the pr⁸spects f⁸r any kind ⁸f change.
The ⁸utput c⁸mp⁸nent ⁸f legitimizati⁸n was massively weakened by ec⁸n⁸mic hardships f⁸r huge parts ⁸f the
p⁸pulati⁸n seeing chances f⁸r impr⁸vement further reduced. Regimes c⁸ntinued t⁸ emphasize their r⁸le as
pr⁸viders ⁸f security, b⁸th internal and external, but th⁸ughmany 4estern g⁸vernments c⁸ntinued t⁸ supp⁸rt
auth⁸ritarian regimes f⁸r precisely this reas⁸n, this argument began t⁸ appear less c⁸nvincing t⁸ Arab citizens
asking themselves whether their security apparatuses guaranteed ⁸r rather endangered their security.
Even repression, by intimidati⁸n and c⁸erci⁸n, began t⁸ er⁸de in a situati⁸n where an increasing number ⁸f
citizens ad⁸pted views like “my life cann⁸t p⁸ssibly get w⁸rse, s⁸ why not pr⁸test”, “they cann⁸t sh⁸⁸t and
kill all ⁸f us”, ⁸r “I need t⁸ d⁸ s⁸mething; it pr⁸bably w⁸n’t change anything f⁸r me, but h⁸pefully it will f⁸r
my kids.”²⁰
In the light ⁸f this acc⁸unt ⁸f mechanisms which, th⁸ugh weakened, still functi⁸ned b⁸th in mutually sup-
p⁸rting themselves and in stabilizing auth⁸ritarian systems, ⁸ne ⁸f the crucial questi⁸ns is h⁸w Arab regimes,
in particular the Egyptian ⁸ne, c⁸llapsed s⁸ suddenly and unexpectedly. The answer is that, c⁸mbined with
the m⁸re persistent mechanisms sketched s⁸ far, during the uprisings in ͯͭͮͭ and ͯͭͮͮ a number ⁸f m⁸re l⁸-
cally ⁸r temp⁸rally limited mechanisms played a signiﬁcant r⁸le. Am⁸ng these are mechanisms ⁸f preference
falsiﬁcati⁸n, and ⁸f virtual and physical m⁸bilizati⁸n. Depending ⁸n envir⁸nmental and c⁸gnitive c⁸nditi⁸ns,
these mechanisms can either pr⁸vide stabilizati⁸n ⁸r pr⁸m⁸te sudden change.
Preference falsiﬁcation is a mechanism based ⁸n the fact that under repressive c⁸nditi⁸ns, parts ⁸r all ⁸f
the p⁸pulace tend t⁸ c⁸nceal their genuine p⁸litical preferences, hence masking a desire f⁸r change, thus
indirectly stabilizing regimes. Speciﬁcally, pe⁸ple are apt t⁸ hide their real preferences f⁸r change as l⁸ng as
ͮͶ Hazem Kandil, “4hy did the Egyptian middle class march t⁸ Tahrir Square?” Mediterranean Politics, ͮ ,ʹ ͯ (ͯͭͮͯ), pp. ͯͭͳ–ͯͮͮ.
ͯͭ Interview with an Egyptian activist, Cair⁸, February ͮ ,ʹ ͯͭͮͮ.
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the perceived c⁸sts ⁸f ⁸penly supp⁸rting the ⁸pp⁸siti⁸n are high in terms ⁸f imperilment.²¹ Preference fal-
siﬁcati⁸n is based ⁸n c⁸gnitive mechanisms, in particular percepti⁸ns ⁸f the relative strength ⁸f regime and
⁸pp⁸siti⁸n, and ensuing pers⁸nal c⁸st-beneﬁt c⁸nsiderati⁸ns that tend t⁸ disc⁸urage individuals t⁸ express
disc⁸ntent ⁸r t⁸ take part in p⁸litical acti⁸n. Once percepti⁸ns start changing, either pr⁸mpted by further
deteri⁸rating p⁸litical ⁸r ec⁸n⁸mic c⁸nditi⁸ns, ⁸r triggered by c⁸ntingent events – f⁸r example, in Tunisia,
the self-imm⁸lati⁸n ⁸f M⁸hamed B⁸uazizi; in Egypt, the killing ⁸f Khaled Said, ⁸r Asmaa Mahf⁸uz’ vide⁸ bl⁸g
calling f⁸r acti⁸n that went viral²² –, preference falsiﬁcati⁸n begins t⁸ er⁸de. Since it inv⁸lves thresh⁸ld mech-
anisms, preference falsiﬁcati⁸n may c⁸llapse speedily ⁸nce a critical number ⁸f pe⁸ple start v⁸icing their
actual preferences, ⁸ften leading t⁸ rev⁸luti⁸nary “surprises.”²³
In Egypt, as elsewhere, m⁸st public p⁸litical ⁸pp⁸siti⁸n had been silenced and repressed during Mubarak’s
presidency. A few public dem⁸nstrati⁸ns ⁸f disc⁸ntent did ⁸ccur (f⁸r example, the bread ri⁸ts ⁸f ͮͶʹ ,ʹ ⁸r the
April ͳ, ͯͭͭ͵ pr⁸tests in El-Mahalla El-Kubra) but m⁸st critical ⁸pini⁸n regarding the regime was kept private,
leading t⁸ an appearance ⁸f high stability ⁸f regimes. Even th⁸ugh s⁸cial media were teeming with v⁸ices
⁸f disc⁸ntent, this d⁸es n⁸t seem t⁸ have been perceived as a genuine threat t⁸ regime stability, neither by
th⁸se engaged in ⁸nline discussi⁸ns n⁸r by security f⁸rces trying t⁸ m⁸nit⁸r these. In Egypt, n⁸t even bl⁸ggers
themselves expected disc⁸ntent t⁸ turn int⁸ widespread physical p⁸litical acti⁸n, n⁸t even after pr⁸tests in
Tunisia had gained pace.²ό In a situati⁸n where average citizens c⁸ntinued t⁸ c⁸nsider public pr⁸test t⁸ be
either t⁸⁸ risky ⁸r n⁸t w⁸rthwhile, n⁸t even the ⁸rganizers ⁸f the ͯͲ January pr⁸tests initially expected suc-
cess; still they decided t⁸ pr⁸test, disregarding their pers⁸nal risk.²ύ H⁸wever, ⁸nce the pr⁸tests gained pace,
and hundreds ⁸f th⁸usands started rallying publicly, widespread preference falsiﬁcati⁸n in Egypt crumbled,
accelerated by tw⁸ events ⁸n January ͯ͵, ͯͭͮͮ c⁸nsidered t⁸ sh⁸w ﬁrst signs ⁸f weakness ⁸n part ⁸f the regime,
starting with the shutting ⁸ff ⁸f internet and m⁸bile ph⁸ne services in the m⁸rning, and culminating in the
withdrawal ⁸f p⁸lice f⁸rces fr⁸m the streets in the evening. These events br⁸ught preference falsiﬁcati⁸n in
Egypt t⁸ a deﬁnite end – in any case, f⁸r the time being.
Mechanisms ⁸f preference falsiﬁcati⁸n are str⁸ngly c⁸nnected with mobilization mechanisms. These include
virtual m⁸bilizati⁸n mechanisms, in particular via s⁸cial media as well as physical m⁸bilizati⁸n mechanisms
ͯͮ Timur Kuran, “Sparks and prairie ﬁres: A the⁸ry ⁸f unanticipated p⁸litical rev⁸luti⁸n,” Public Choice, ͳͮ, ͮ (ͮͶ͵Ͷ), p. ͮͱ.
ͯͯ Asmaa Mahf⁸uz, “3ide⁸ bl⁸g, ͮ͵ January.” Available at: http://www.y⁸utube.c⁸m/watch?v=ZhbKNͶqͰͮͶg, accessed March ͮ ,ʹ
ͯͭͮͮ.
ͯͰ Timur Kuran, “The inevitability ⁸f future rev⁸luti⁸nary surprises,” American Journal of Sociology, ͮͭͭ, ͳ (ͮͶͶͲ), p. ͮͲͯ͵.
ͯͱ As ⁸ne Egyptian activist put it, “the news fr⁸m Tunisia is interesting but n⁸thing ⁸f the s⁸rt will happen in Egypt; Mubarak c⁸uld
rule Tunisia with ⁸ne hand, nay, with ⁸ne little ﬁnger” (interview, Cair⁸, December ͯ ,ʹ ͯͭͮͭ; all interviews were c⁸nducted in
c⁸nﬁdentiality, and the names ⁸f interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement).
ͯͲ M⁸na El-Naggar, “Equal rights takes t⁸ the barricades,” New York Times. Available at: http://www.nytimes.c⁸m/ͯͭͮͮ/ͭͯ/ͭͯ/
w⁸rld/middleeast/ͭͯiht-letterͭͯ.html, accessed March ͮͮ, ͯͭͮͮ; interview with an Egyptian activist, Cair⁸, Oct⁸ber ͯͮ, ͯͭͮͱ.
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f⁸r direct p⁸litical acti⁸n. During signiﬁcant time peri⁸ds bef⁸re the uprisings, virtual mobilization mecha-
nisms w⁸rked as self-reinf⁸rcing p⁸sitive feedbackmechanisms, in particular due t⁸ the instantane⁸us nature
⁸f the medium but als⁸ the widespread – th⁸ugh naive – assumpti⁸n that the security f⁸rces were f⁸cused
⁸n the Muslim Br⁸therh⁸⁸d rather that y⁸ung pe⁸ple fr⁸m the c⁸-⁸pted middle class, s⁸ users ⁸f s⁸cial me-
dia c⁸uld ⁸r w⁸uld n⁸t be targeted.²ώ Thus, virtual m⁸bilizati⁸n was much less affected by the mechanism ⁸f
preference falsiﬁcati⁸n than physical m⁸bilizati⁸n w⁸uld have been.²Ϗ
Still, even str⁸ng virtual m⁸bilizati⁸n al⁸ne d⁸es n⁸t mean that p⁸litical acti⁸n is taken ⁸ut ⁸n the streets.
Thus mechanisms ⁸f m⁸bilizati⁸n require physical mobilizationmechanisms, t⁸⁸. H⁸wever, t⁸ the extent that
physical m⁸bilizati⁸n was planned by ⁸pp⁸siti⁸n elites, they t⁸⁸k int⁸ acc⁸unt the virtual m⁸bilizati⁸n already
achieved, and scheduled dem⁸nstrati⁸ns acc⁸rdingly. Again, this time ⁸n the street, self-reinf⁸rcing p⁸sitive
feedback mechanisms were at w⁸rk: Once a small, but critical mass ⁸f dem⁸nstrat⁸rs perceived t⁸ be s⁸
numer⁸us as n⁸t likely t⁸ be immediately diss⁸lved and taken int⁸ cust⁸dy by security f⁸rces had taken
t⁸ the streets, their presence and number m⁸tivated ever-increasing numbers ⁸f additi⁸nal residents and
bystanders t⁸ j⁸in the pr⁸tests.²ϐ The c⁸nsci⁸us planning by ⁸pp⁸siti⁸n leaders included making use ⁸f the
fact that after Friday prayers signiﬁcant numbers ⁸f pe⁸ple, pred⁸minantly men, already had assembled, and
⁸f the strategy ⁸f leading pr⁸test marches thr⁸ugh backstreets ﬁrst until a critical mass ⁸f dem⁸nstrat⁸rs
had c⁸me t⁸gether.²ϑ Thus, the m⁸bilizati⁸n mechanism gained tracti⁸n by the ass⁸ciati⁸n ⁸f middle class
activists with l⁸wer class pe⁸ple, the latter much m⁸re exp⁸sed t⁸ and experienced with p⁸lice vi⁸lence. This
generated a massive impact ⁸n m⁸bilizati⁸n, als⁸ due t⁸ the fact that it c⁸unteracted preference falsiﬁcati⁸n
by pr⁸viding a feeling ⁸f safety in numbers and reduced vulnerability.
In additi⁸n, mechanisms f⁸r pr⁸m⁸ting de-escalati⁸n during dem⁸nstrati⁸ns were used: Pr⁸testers empl⁸yed
pacifying strategies, including activists calming the h⁸theads am⁸ng the dem⁸nstrat⁸rs, displaying pacifying
signs and even gestures ⁸f affecti⁸n t⁸ward members ⁸f the security f⁸rces, and sh⁸wing nati⁸nal symb⁸ls,
meant t⁸ emphasize nati⁸nal unity, t⁸ establish a link t⁸ and pacify security f⁸rces.³⁰ In effect, these strategies
emb⁸died negative feedback mechanisms whereby ⁸pp⁸siti⁸n activists c⁸nsci⁸usly c⁸⁸led d⁸wn p⁸tential
escalati⁸ns ⁸r erupti⁸ns ⁸f vi⁸lence. In turn, the interplay between successful de-escalati⁸n that kept the
ͯͳ S⁸me ⁸pp⁸siti⁸n activists exercised m⁸re cauti⁸n, th⁸ugh: The leaﬂet Kayfa tathour bi-hadaa’ia: Ma‘aloumaat wa-taktikaat
haamma [H⁸w t⁸ pr⁸test intelligently: imp⁸rtant inf⁸rmati⁸n and tactics] (Cair⁸, January ͯͭͮͮ). Available at: http://inf⁸.
publicintelligence.net/EgyptianRev⁸luti⁸nManual.pdf, accessed March ͳ, ͯͭͮͯ, used f⁸r preparing street pr⁸tests c⁸ntains
warnings against transmitting the leaﬂet’s c⁸ntent via Twitter and Faceb⁸⁸k, claiming these “are being m⁸nit⁸red” (p. ͮ, ͯͳ),
th⁸ugh it rec⁸mmends, s⁸mewhat inc⁸ngru⁸usly, distributing it by email in additi⁸n t⁸ printing and ph⁸t⁸c⁸pying.
ͯʹ See als⁸ Derek Greg⁸ry, “Tahrir: P⁸litics, publics and perf⁸rmances ⁸f space,” Middle East Critique, ͯͯ, Ͱ (ͯͭͮͰ), pp. ͯͰͳ–ͯͰ .ʹ
ͯ͵ Interview with an Egyptian activist, Cair⁸, February ͮ ,ʹ ͯͭͮͮ.
ͯͶ This meticul⁸us planning is captured in the leaﬂet Kayfa tathour bi-hadaa’ia, pp. ͱ–͵, including diagrams and maps.
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p⁸sitive feedback mechanisms ⁸f physical m⁸bilizati⁸n g⁸ing, and gr⁸wing numbers ⁸f dem⁸nstrat⁸rs wh⁸
c⁸mpensated f⁸r vi⁸lence by sheer numbers led t⁸ the result ⁸f making dem⁸nstrati⁸ns b⁸th peaceful and
p⁸werful.
4hat f⁸ll⁸wed, is well kn⁸wn: After eighteen days ⁸f pr⁸tests Mubarak resigned as president, handing p⁸wer
⁸ver t⁸ the Supreme C⁸uncil ⁸f the Armed F⁸rces, wh⁸ in fact managed t⁸ rem⁸ve the m⁸mentum fr⁸m the
hands ⁸f the rev⁸luti⁸naries. Parliamentary electi⁸ns fr⁸m N⁸vember ͯͭͮͮ t⁸ January ͯͭͮͯ resulted in a clear
maj⁸rity f⁸r the Freed⁸m and Justice Party and the Al-N⁸ur Party. Presidential electi⁸ns were held in May
and June ͯͭͮͯ, with the Muslim Br⁸therh⁸⁸d candidate M⁸hammed M⁸rsi winning by a narr⁸w margin ⁸ver
Ahmed Shaﬁk, Mubarak’s last prime minister. Fr⁸m the p⁸int ⁸f view ⁸f the rev⁸luti⁸naries, the sec⁸nd r⁸und
⁸f the electi⁸ns pitted tw⁸ equally unattractive alternatives against each ⁸ther, representatives ⁸f the Mus-
lim Br⁸therh⁸⁸d and the ⁸ld regime, thus nearly silencing the ⁸riginal v⁸ices ⁸f the pr⁸tests. During M⁸rsi’s
presidency, a rapid ad⁸pti⁸n ⁸f p⁸licies al⁸ng familiar auth⁸ritarian patterns c⁸uld be ⁸bserved, culminating
in M⁸rsi’s N⁸vember ͯͭͮͯ declarati⁸n immunizing his decrees fr⁸m any challenge. Renewed mass pr⁸tests in
June ͯͭͮͰ demanded early presidential electi⁸ns, and led, after M⁸rsi ch⁸se t⁸ ign⁸re an ultimatum by the
military calling f⁸r the res⁸luti⁸n ⁸f his differences with ⁸pp⁸nents, t⁸ M⁸rsi’s ⁸verthr⁸w, vari⁸usly described
as c⁸up d’état, ⁸r the sec⁸nd Egyptian rev⁸luti⁸n. Since then, the regime ⁸f Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s, c⁸mmander-
in-chief ⁸f the Armed F⁸rces and Minister ⁸f Defence at the time ⁸f M⁸rsi’s ⁸verthr⁸w, then elected president
in May ͯͭͮͱ, str⁸ngly resembles a new editi⁸n ⁸f Mubarak’s system.
C⁸nsidering the central mechanisms ⁸f ne⁸patrim⁸nial auth⁸ritarianism, we have t⁸ realize that the ⁸verall
framew⁸rk has n⁸t been substituted by any alternatives. As it turned ⁸ut, the sh⁸rt-term mechanisms that
were efﬁcient in t⁸ppling the Mubarak and M⁸rsi regimes have w⁸rn ⁸ut with subsequent devel⁸pments. In
ambigu⁸us phases between early ͯͭͮͮ and mid-ͯͭͮͰ, sympt⁸ms ⁸f fatigue ⁸n the part ⁸f the rev⁸luti⁸naries
peri⁸dically alternated with renewed intensity ⁸f pr⁸tests. At the time ⁸f writing, h⁸wever, preference falsiﬁ-
cati⁸n has reappeared as a universal phen⁸men⁸n, and m⁸bilizati⁸n, b⁸th virtual and physical is apparently
at a l⁸w ebb again.
Hence, the l⁸ng-termmechanisms ⁸f ne⁸patrim⁸nial auth⁸ritarianism, in place fr⁸mMubarak t⁸ SCAF t⁸M⁸rsi
t⁸ al-Sisi have gained imp⁸rtance again, in c⁸mbinati⁸n with the general de-dem⁸cratizing mechanisms in-
v⁸lving trust netw⁸rks n⁸t embedded in public p⁸licy, inequality being instrumentalized, and the persistence
⁸f largely aut⁸n⁸m⁸us p⁸wer centers such as the military. M⁸re speciﬁcally, h⁸wever, al-Sisi’s p⁸licies can be
interpreted as attempts at rec⁸nstructi⁸n ⁸f the three mechanisms ⁸f ne⁸patrim⁸nial rule, legitimati⁸n, c⁸-
⁸ptati⁸n, and repressi⁸n, with renewed and, c⁸mpared with his predecess⁸rs, at times excepti⁸nal eff⁸rt. New
pr⁸jects such as the expansi⁸n ⁸f the Suez Canal mirr⁸r a Nasserist (⁸r sh⁸uld ⁸ne say, Phara⁸nic?) appr⁸ach,
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clearly aimed at legitimati⁸n by creati⁸n ⁸f j⁸bs and stimulati⁸n ⁸f the ec⁸n⁸my.
The extent ⁸f the eff⁸rt t⁸ ⁸btain legitimati⁸n is mirr⁸red by the extent ⁸f repressi⁸n ⁸f all kinds ⁸f real ⁸r
assumed ⁸pp⁸nents ⁸r critics ⁸f the regime, currently at an all-time high, and n⁸w als⁸ directed against the
middle class. C⁸⁸ptati⁸n n⁸w partly c⁸nsists in accepting the am⁸unt ⁸f repressi⁸n in exchange f⁸r ec⁸n⁸mic
advantages. Similarly, security issues and the campaign against terr⁸rism (a label which includes p⁸litical
⁸pp⁸nents) are used t⁸ create a legitimating narrative. The escalati⁸n and amalgamati⁸n ⁸f repressi⁸n and
legitimati⁸n eff⁸rts culminate in depicting the regimes’s measures as the “her⁸ic” ﬁght against terr⁸rism by
the champi⁸ns ⁸f the “sec⁸nd Egyptian rev⁸luti⁸n.”³¹
Even s⁸, the current regime’s extensive eff⁸rts t⁸wards re-establishing auth⁸ritarian structures may n⁸t ⁸nly
be interpreted as a reimplementati⁸n ⁸f what w⁸rked f⁸r Mubarak and ⁸ther auth⁸ritarian rulers f⁸r many
years but at the same time as an indicat⁸r ⁸f b⁸th a fundamental lack ⁸f visi⁸n, and a fear that themechanisms
supp⁸rting auth⁸ritarianismmight break d⁸wn again just as rapidly as then did in early ͯͭͮͮ sh⁸uld situati⁸ns
arise that all⁸w rev⁸luti⁸nary mechanisms t⁸ gain tracti⁸n again. It is ⁸pen t⁸ debate whether the current
reissue ⁸f the system is built ⁸n sand fr⁸m its start.
Conclusion
This analysis has tried t⁸ call attenti⁸n t⁸ the advantages ⁸f a mechanism-based appr⁸ach t⁸ analyzing and
explaining the netw⁸rks ⁸f causal fact⁸rs pr⁸m⁸ting ⁸r inhibiting dem⁸cratic change and t⁸ highlight that an
adequate explanati⁸n ⁸f dem⁸cratic transiti⁸n requires mechanism-based acc⁸unts ⁸f actual causal inter-
acti⁸n and interdependence ⁸f fact⁸rs, including general and persistent c⁸nditi⁸ns such as s⁸cial, cultural,
religi⁸us, and ec⁸n⁸mic c⁸nditi⁸ns as well as c⁸ntingent, time-, place-, and act⁸r-speciﬁc details such as
changes in public percepti⁸n ⁸f p⁸litical issues, extent ⁸f mass m⁸bilizati⁸n, electi⁸n results, ⁸r decisi⁸ns
by elites ⁸r crucial act⁸rs. Hence, the mechanistic framew⁸rk pr⁸vides a systemic appr⁸ach f⁸cusing less ⁸n
single causes but ⁸n their interc⁸nnectedness and interacti⁸n.
The case study ⁸n Egypt has sh⁸wn h⁸w mechanisms ⁸f legitimati⁸n, c⁸-⁸ptati⁸n, and repressi⁸n have sta-
bilized an auth⁸ritarian system, but als⁸ h⁸w envir⁸nmental and c⁸gnitive inﬂuences altered and weakened
these mechanisms ⁸ver time, and h⁸w “rev⁸luti⁸nary” mechanisms, given fav⁸rable c⁸nditi⁸ns led t⁸ the t⁸p-
pling ⁸f Mubarak’s presidency. The re-establishment ⁸f auth⁸ritarian structures under M⁸rsi and even m⁸re
s⁸ under al-Sisi als⁸ sh⁸ws their c⁸nsiderable p⁸wer ⁸f persistence, r⁸⁸ted in structural, instituti⁸nal and
Ͱͮ Interviews with retired seni⁸r ⁸fﬁcials fr⁸m the Egyptian F⁸reign Ministry, Cair⁸, ͯͮ Oct⁸ber ͯͭͮͱ.
ͮͯ
c⁸gnitive entrenchment. In particular, the p⁸st-rev⁸luti⁸nary devel⁸pments in Egypt dem⁸nstrate that the
“rev⁸luti⁸nary y⁸uth” did n⁸t succeed in establishing an alternative m⁸del pr⁸viding legitimati⁸n t⁸ a liberal
dem⁸cratic p⁸litical system.
4ith regard t⁸ future devel⁸pment, ⁸ne ⁸f the key advantages ⁸f this mechanism-based appr⁸ach is that,
bey⁸nd merely identifying future trends it all⁸ws the f⁸rmulati⁸n ⁸f if-then statements. F⁸r example, if the
efﬁciency ⁸f mechanisms supp⁸rting auth⁸ritarianism, i.e., legitimati⁸n, c⁸-⁸ptati⁸n, and repressi⁸n is de-
creased, if preference falsiﬁcati⁸n can be ⁸verc⁸me, and if mass m⁸bilizati⁸n can be achieved, then rev⁸lu-
ti⁸nary ⁸verthr⁸w ⁸f a regime is p⁸ssible. The current regime, it seems, is well aware ⁸f these if-then’s, and
acts acc⁸rdingly – but mechanisms, in particular s⁸cial mechanisms are n⁸t machines, and (rev⁸luti⁸nary)
surprises remain p⁸ssible.
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